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The End of Innocence:
An Actual Knowledge Threshold for Intermediaries
Holding Fiduciaries'/Clients' Assets
Robert B. Edesess, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Enron, Andersen, Worldom, Parmalat, Tyco, Pimco, Spear Leed &
Kellogg, Dick Grasso, Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic. The past
couple years have shown us a smorgasbord of malfeasance among cor-
porate directors and within the primary and secondary markets. The
troubles in the financial world extend well beyond companies to the
markets themselves. In the end of the last century, the US and the
world witnessed the effects of some of the worst misconduct ever.
Yet, we must be careful not to let one type of problem provoke fears
and justify unnecessary, deleterious burdens on the economy as a
whole and losing sight of global, long-term effects. Unnecessary costs
can blow through the economy like a strong breeze at this time when
the economy needs a push back from the brink. In these scandal-rid-
den times, it is all too easy to support restrictions everywhere so that
we can feel confidant that these isolated scandals will not be repeated.
What would this country be without effective, efficient financial
markets? Financial markets, mostly the indirect financing market,
play an essential role in the function and growth of our economy.1
The financial markets provide a mechanism for directing excess, idle
funds to borrowers in need of money for new projects. Without an
effective financial market, the US economy would contract, examples
of which have been seen over the last century in many developing and
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D. expected 2005; DePaul University Kellstadt Grad-
uate School of Business, M.B.A., expected 2005; Tufts University College of Engineering,
B.S.M.E., 1998.
1. The indirect financing system in the United States plays a central role in the economy as the
primary source of funding. Among the largest producing economies in the world, most of which
have a more highly-regulated financial market, the role of indirect financing is even larger. For a
good overview of the operation of financing systems, see COLIN MAYER, FINANCIAL SYSTEMS,
CORPORATE FINANCE, AND ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, CORPO-
RATE FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 307-332 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1990).
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non-functioning economies.2 Even a slight increase in the costs of fi-
nancing could severely inhibit long-term growth prospects.
In the highly efficient US markets, added costs to market partici-
pants will lead to increased prices in the market. The added costs will
ripple through the economy and cause exponential contraction of eco-
nomic output.3 Similarly, if a market participant reduces costs, that
cost savings will be reflected in the market price. An increased likeli-
hood of liability arising from loan services will not allow lenders to
compete with each other at the current price. This higher cost of fi-
nancing will lead to less funds being loaned to growing businesses.
The decrease of funds will in turn lead to less capital investment and
decreased long-term growth in productivity and output.4 Likewise, a
decrease in the cost of financing via the indirect markets would boost
long-term economic prospects.
5
This article focuses on a very specific type of transaction handled by
securities intermediaries that has not been in the news yet but which
can have large economic ramifications. Specifically, this article dis-
cusses statutory protection of securities intermediaries effectuating
transactions for client-trustees. 6 In the typical example, a trustee may
manage funds for a beneficiary but deposit the funds with a third-
party bank. The bank accepting the funds will receive a copy of the
trust agreement but otherwise have no direct connection to the bene-
2. In recent years, the hyperinflation economies of developing countries have been a drain to
world development. Even with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, no real solu-
tion has been found to create a stable, efficient market in some countries and to increase the
livelihood of the people in these developing countries. The near collapses of Russia and Brazil
provide a forewarning of what could potentially occur if the local financial markets collapsed.
3. Very generally, if the associated risk is lowered, the price will be lower. This allows borrow-
ers to obtain capital cheaper. This in turn allows for investment in more projects. Such effects
occur according the Money Multiplier Effect. See Section IV for further explanation.
4. Higher financing costs for investment would lead businesses to choose to extend current
operations rather than seeking financing to expand business operations. A shift in the choices
that businesses make would have large effects in the economy. On the contrary, lower costs of
financing would spur business to borrow more and expand production.
5. Making financing more affordable would lead businesses to expand. The lower financing
cost would spur capital spending much like a lowering of interest rates. In turn, the capital
spending now would increase capital stock for the future, leading to higher natural output for the
economy.
6. The law of trusts and securities is admittedly broad in scope. Trustees themselves can be
anything for a group of individuals working for a single, wealthy family to a trustee company to
the largest bank in the country. Moreover, trustees can have a wide range of power, including
unlimited power. This article will focus on trustees who have deposited assets in an independent
bank. The article will also be practically focused on the gray areas of trustee power. It is clear
that a bank should take note of whether it has received a copy of the Power of Attorney or Trust
Agreement, but problems mainly arise where a trustee has acted beyond its power in the trust
agreement. This article also focuses on problems where a trustee acted negligently or converted
the funds, yet is judgment-proof for whatever reason.
INTERMEDIARIES HOLDING ASSETS
ficiary. In such a case, several parties typically have an interest in the
transaction: the intermediary responsible for holding the funds and
effectuating the transfer, the trustee, and the beneficiary. Every state
has at least one statute providing protection to such banks against lia-
bility to the trustee and beneficiary, but this article focuses on exactly
how much protection is and should be afforded to the holding bank.
One may ask why such a transaction is of any importance given the
overall size of the financial markets. Though pension funds and cor-
porations and others are the major participants in secondary financial
markets rather than trustees, the level of protection afforded the re-
spective trust holding banks may have a dramatic impact on the func-
tioning of financial markets. Even small changes in the costs of
financing will lead to changes in the demand for financing across the
entire economy. In the arena of trust management, a holding bank
usually does not play a role other than to effectuate transfers. If a
fiduciary breaches its duty, it will be responsible for the loss. In some
circumstances, however, the holding bank that also effectuated the
transfer may be a prime target for beneficiaries looking for relief
when a fiduciary has breached its duty. An example may be the case
when the fiduciary is judgment proof. Though most states grant a stat-
utory safe harbor to securities intermediaries holding funds for fiduci-
aries to simplify transactions, this article argues that these safe harbor
statutes can be too easily pierced thus leaving banks holding the funds
with a large risk of liability and high administrative costs. 7
Securities intermediaries play a central role in the functioning of the
overall financial system in the United States. 8 Protection for financial
intermediaries not only protects these large firms and the people asso-
ciated with their businesses but also protects all of those who seek
funding in the indirect market, the majority of firms in the developed
world. 9 If financial intermediaries are burdened with high, unex-
7. Generally, the policy behind a safe harbor for securities intermediaries holding funds for
fiduciary clients proposes to simplify the transaction process for intermediaries by allowing them
to make assumptions as to whether entitlement orders from fiduciary clients are proper. The
underlying basis for most of these statutes is to make such transactions faster and less costly,
often in order to keep up with the increasing speed and volume of transactions in the indirect
and direct financing systems. See Scott E. Nutter & Bryan T. Pratt, A Practitioners' Guide to
Revised Articles 5 and 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Mo. L. REv. 325 (1998). The
statutory safe harbors, however, do not render intermediaries completely immune from liability.
8. See supra note 1.
9. Financial firms and large corporations dominate the direct finance markets. Studies of ma-
jor developed countries, however, show that lending usually passes through the indirect financ-
ing system and not by going directly to debt sellers in the securities markets. In Japan and
Germany, financing from financial intermediaries has been almost ten times greater than that in
securities markets. See Mayer, supra note 1. The role of financial intermediaries in these coun-
2004]
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pected costs in the form of potential liability, there is a risk of hinder-
ing the indirect market. If higher costs are imposed on intermediaries,
some intermediaries may be forced out of the market. This in turn
leads to a greater risk of problems associated with asymmetric infor-
mation problem and liquidity.
Moreover, if higher costs are imposed on financial intermediaries,
those who utilize them will have to pay the costs passed off to them
resulting from a less efficient market. The result of these higher costs
will logically be a change in decisions regarding business spending, a
key component of economic output and wealth.
The broad purpose of this article is two-fold: to explain the current
statutory framework in this area and to argue for broader protection
of intermediaries. Several model statutes have been drafted and
adopted by the states to lessen the costs of transacting entitlement
orders by client-fiduciaries. 10 In order to provide a context for discus-
sion, this article will begin by giving an overview of the standards for
imposing liability on securities intermediaries holding funds for clients
serving as fiduciaries in Section 11.11 The background of the common
law standard will be described in Section II-A. Moreover, a discussion
of the proper role of industry standards, such as the N.Y.S.E. "Know
Your Customer" rule, will be discussed. Next, in Section II-B, the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act ("U.F.A.") will be summarized. The U.F.A.,
drafted in 1922, was the first model statute drafted in this area of the
law. Then, a brief overview of subsequent statutory reforms and pro-
tections will be discussed and summarized.1 2
tries has been even larger than in the United States due to regulations and economic structure.
Japan, for example, has been dominated by the Keiretsu structures anchored by a securities
intermediary.
10. Several uniform statutes will be discussed including Chapter 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. All states have adopted at least one form of statutory protection for intermediaries hold-
ing funds and conducting transactions for fiduciaries.
11. Hereinafter, "fiduciary" and "trustee" will be used interchangeably; although, personal
representatives, agents, and others are included in the broad category of fiduciaries. The statutes
discussed apply to the entire category; however, "trustee" will be used primarily. Likewise, "set-
tlor" and "trustor"; "securities intermediaries" and "financial intermediaries"; and "bank" and
"agent" will be used interchangeably. "Client-fiduciaries" refers to bank clients who have a
fiduciary duty to a separate third party. The designation "securities intermediary" can refer to
several categories of firms acting as conduits in the indirect financing system. Commercial
banks, however, are the largest category of securities intermediaries. See Table 1 for a break-
down of securities intermediaries. In the economic sense, "securities intermediaries" refers to
firms that take ownership of an asset. For example, a bank may take ownership of an issue,
repackage it, and then sell the repackaged issue. In contrast, a broker-dealer or firm taking a
company public merely acts as a "facilitator" and takes no long-term ownership of the asset.
12. It should also be noted that the statutes to be discussed do not all deal with the same
categories of fiduciaries. Some pertain specifically to trustees whereas others also apply to fidu-
ciary agents and others. Moreover, the statutes often pertain to different transactions. For ex-
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The statutory background section, Section II, will include an expla-
nation of how the modern uniform statutes adopted by most states
apply in conjunction with the common law and exchange rules. The
discussion will include how the standard of protection can be deter-
mined in states where several of the uniform statutes have been
adopted. Specifically, the discussion will include states where succes-
sive uniform statutes have been adopted and older uniform statutes,
such as the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Securities
Transfers have not been repealed.
Next, Section III will focus on the current trend towards greater
protection of securities intermediaries dealing with fiduciaries. It will
be argued that the statutory trend supports uniform adoption by all
states of the broadest statutory protection-an actual knowledge stan-
dard for imposition of liability. It will be argued that the underlying
purpose of each successive uniform statute shows a trend toward
greater protection, namely an actual knowledge standard, of securities
intermediaries holding for fiduciaries. Moreover, a discussion of the
economic and policy justifications for an actual knowledge standard
will follow. A discussion of the impact of an actual knowledge stan-
dard will be discussed. Some critics argue that greater protection of
securities intermediaries will leave beneficiaries without recourse
whereas the securities intermediaries are able to act with lesser care
than would otherwise be required. 13 Answers to the concerns of these
critics will be offered in Sections III and IV. Section IV provides a
summary of the arguments in Section III and offers a forecast of the
potential effects of adoption of an actual knowledge standard
nationwide.
II. BACKGROUND: CURRENT PROTECTIONS AFFORDED SECURITIES
INTERMEDIARIES DEALING wiTH FIDUCIARIES
Securities intermediaries, the majority of which are commercial
banks, hold funds for any number of organizations. 14 The number and
ample, the U.T.P.A. does not apply with regard to government securities. See UNIF. TRUSTEES
POWERS Acr, 7C U.L.A. 388 (1964) [hereinafter U.T.P.A.]. The focus of this article, though
broadly looking at fiduciaries, is on large-firm trustees as clients of securities intermediaries.
The arguments in this article generally hold with respect to each of the respective uniform laws
discussed.
13. Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., The Transmogrification of the American Trust, 31 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 251 (1996) (arguing that the trend has been to prefer the third-party bank holding the
funds over the beneficiary except where there is evidence of actual notice of breach of fiduciary
duty and that maybe the drafters never intended such a standard because it does not allow
beneficiaries to force third-party banks to exercise the reasonable care otherwise required).
14. Due to the fact that most securities intermediaries are commercial banks, hereinafter the
terms "bank" and "securities intermediary" will be used interchangeably. It should also be
2004]
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variety of business organizations holding funds for others is as wide as
the creative energies of the global financial industry. The following
analysis shall be limited specifically to the duty that arises when secur-
ities intermediaries hold funds for clients acting as fiduciaries and/or
trustees for third-parties. It should be noted, however, that many of
the rules discussed below apply very broadly to any securities broker
or bank holding funds.
Financial intermediaries are categorized as depository institutions,
contractual savings institutions, and investment intermediaries.15 Ta-
ble 1 provides an overview of Financial intermediaries in terms of as-
sets. The flexibility of modern trusts means that trustees are often
administering trusts funded by assets in any of the categories given in
Table 1.
TABLE 1. ASSETS OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES'
6
Value of Assets
($ billions, end of year)
1970 1980 1990 2001
Depository Institutions
Commercial Banks 517 1481 3334 6689
Savings and Loans 250 792 1365 1288
Credit Unions 18 67 215 496
Contractual Savings Institutions
Life Insurance Companies 201 464 1367 3140
Fire and Casualty Insurance 50 182 533 863
Pension Funds 112 504 1629 4040
State and Local Government
Retirement Funds 60 197 737 2078
Investment Intermediaries
Finance Companies 64 205 610 1136
Mutual Funds 47 70 654 3705
Money Market Mutual
Funds 0 76 498 2116
The modern money and banking system has evolved into a complex
network of entities performing a wide-variety and high volume of
transactions around the globe. Financing is provided by the market
through indirect or direct financing systems. In the indirect financing
noted that many of the statutes discussed also extend protection to broker agents and others
even if not explicitly mentioned.
15. FREDERIC MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
(6th ed. Update Addison-Wesley 2003).
16. Id. (citing Federal Reserve Flows, which are available on a daily, weekly, quarterly, and
annually basis on the Federal Reserve Board website at www.federalreserve.gov/releases).
INTERMEDIARIES HOLDING ASSETS
system where most people will go for financing, commercial banks will
be the primary movers of money.
A fiduciary breach can be especially troubling in the case where the
beneficiary has been deprived of rightful funds and did not have any
interest in the drafting of the trust agreement. One can imagine a case
where the trust was created merely for sheltering assets, but the bene-
ficiary instead finds him or herself without the funds due to the fiduci-
ary's breach.
Trusts created to take advantages of more favorable tax codes or to
shelter assets are common trusts involved in this scenario. Testamen-
tary trusts may also be common due to the complexity of estate plan-
ning and possible tax benefits. A less common type of trust where
social policy might be different is that of trusts where the trustor is
also a beneficiary. An example of a correlated situation would be
where a beneficiary of an insurance policy, settlement agreement, lot-
tery winnings, or otherwise has his or her lawyer draft a trust agree-
ment to provide for more tax-favorable distribution of the proceeds
and management of the funds by someone of experience.
Banks will also hold funds for any number of companies and private
individuals alike. These banks will have a variety of standards for in-
quiry into the actions of clients imposed by both common law and
statutory law.17 The banks are motivated to know more about their
clients in order to avoid liability on contribution theories. As a result
of the fallout from the recent scandals, a greater pressure has been put
on those who deal with companies acting improperly. As an example,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act includes an informant provision that seems to
impose a burden on law firms and others assisting company-clients
acting wrongfully. 18 A duty is also imposed depending on the client.
The USA Patriot Act has provided more stringent duties on banks
with respect to turning over information about particular clients to the
federal government. 19 Focusing the loss on the firm with the most
17. It should be noted that some of the statutory protections apply to securities intermediaries
while others apply to brokers and agents. This article will focus on securities intermediaries;
however, the support for an actual knowledge safe harbor applies to both equally. The underly-
ing purpose of all the statutes applies to both the direct and indirect holding systems. Moreover,
while securities intermediaries are the main players in the indirect holding system, agent-brokers
play the same sort of role as conduits in the direct holding system.
18. Ronald R. Glancz, Financial Services Modernization 2003: Implementation of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, SH060 ALI-ABA 1, *13 (2003).
19. See generally USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The USA Patriot has
still been rarely used in this respect. Manhattan's District Attorney has recently begun an inves-
tigation of J.P. Morgan to determine whether Chemical Bank, which it had acquired, violated
the USA Patriot Act's "know your customer" rules. Randall Smith, J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat
of Patriot Act, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at C1. Similar rules exist in other areas like exchanges.
20041
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funds-to absorb it only serves to obfuscate the underlying problem. In
the example above, the problem clearly is the wrongdoing of the fidu-
ciary against which the trustor may have little recourse in the case of,
inter alia, fiduciary insolvency or disappearance.
20
Typically, however, the bank's client will not be acting in a fiduciary
capacity in regards to a third party. In the most egregious circum-
stances, even officers of the securities intermediary may be liable as
co-participants in, but not an enabler of, the transaction.21 The duty
of ordinary care will not impose an inquiry duty where the client is not
holding funds for another.22 Lastly, there are a host of other reasons
why a securities intermediary may need to inquire into the identity
and powers of its clients. One of the most recent and noteworthy of
these is the USA Patriot Act, which requires banks and financial insti-
tutions to investigate clients to assure that they are not funding so-
called terrorist activities.23 This article focuses on negligence and con-
version theories in the case where a securities intermediary holds
funds for a client acting as a trustee pursuant to a trust agreement with
a third party.
A. The View of The Common Law and Exchange Rules
Under the common law, securities intermediaries must exercise or-
dinary care.24 While securities intermediaries generally do not have a
special relationship requiring a higher standard of care akin to that of
a fiduciary duty, they still must exercise a level of care consistent with
20. For an overview of balancing the burden between fiduciary and beneficiary, see Charles
M. Bennett, When the Fiduciary's Agent Errs-Who Pays the Bill-Fiduciary, Agent, or Benefici-
ary?, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 429 (1993).
21. Hannah v. Midwest Center for Disability, 536 N.E.2d 888, 892 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (officer
of company may be liable if participant in action under contributory negligence theory).
22. As the enabler of the action, a bank, agent, or any other may not intentionally turn a blind
eye to wrongdoing and thus must make an inquiry under certain circumstances. Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Bank One, 1997 WL 428515, *5 (N.D. I11. 1997) (liability for willful blindness). The bank
will be -required to exercise reasonable care and inquire accordingly in order to avoid liability
under negligence theory.
23. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). For cases generally construing
the USA Patriot Act amendment see generally Stoutt v. Banco Popular De P.R., 320 F.3d 26 (1st
Cir. 2003) (bank's requirement to report illegal actions of clients) and Handschu v. Special Servs.
Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (modification of a consent decree
under the Act relating to intelligence gathering activities); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill,
207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (considering the "freezing" of funds of a charity, the USA
Patriot Act does not modify the rules of evidence).
24. Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 182




that of the industry. 25 The common law duty of care imposes upon
securities intermediaries a duty of performing due diligence under sus-
picious circumstances such as notice that the client is acting as a fidu-
ciary or adverse claims to the funds. 26 When receiving directives from
clients, the common law requires that securities intermediaries ensure
that the funds transferred are properly applied.
27
Under the common law standard, securities intermediaries must be
judged based on industry standards, which in many cases can be sup-
ported by evidence of industry rules and regulations. 28 Most securities
intermediaries now represent a massive collection of resources and
services in order to gain from economies of scale and in order to at-
tract larger clientele desiring one provider for a multitude of ser-
vices.2 9 Therefore, most securities intermediaries are members and/or
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange ("N.Y.S.E.") or a similar
exchange. The N.Y.S.E. lists nearly 2,800 of the largest companies in
the US.3° Similarly, the NASDAQ market, which is a network of bro-
ker-dealers as opposed to a physical trading floor like the N.Y.S.E.,
lists over 4,000 companies, over half of the companies traded in the
US primary markets, and trades more shares than any other US equi-
ties market.
31
The N.Y.S.E. has set forth a number of rules for members con-
ducting transactions within the exchange. 32 N.Y.S.E. Rule 405,. com-
monly referred to as the "Know Your Customer Rule," is often cited
to support the argument that a bank has a duty to perform due dili-
25. See generally Allison-Williams, 519 N.W.2d 176; Chilson, 306 N.W. 2d 893 (both cases
holding the duty of care would be judged by reference to the degree of care exercised by other
securities companies in similar circumstances).
26. Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 F. Cas. 1040 (D. Md. 1848) (issuers will be
liable for registering a transfer on the orders of registered owner acting wrongfully against a
third person).
27. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth State Bank, 265 F.3d 601, 623 (7th Cir. 2001)
(stating that a bank has a duty to inquire into the authority of one cashing a check to ensure that
the proceeds are properly applied).
28. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (agency rules do not
provide a cause of action but "these matters may be considered on the issue of scope and extent
of a broker's duty of care owed his customer.")
29. Remarks by Federal Reserve Bank Governor Laurence H. Meyer before the 1998 Com-
munity Reinvestment Act Conference of the Consumer Bankers Association, Arlington, Vir-
ginia, May 12, 1998, available at http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/speeches/1998/
19980512.htm.
30. Available at www.N.Y.S.E.com.
31. Available at www.nasdaq.com.
32. Exchange rules are only loosely applied currently; however, the SEC has pushed for
greater application of the rules in all exchanges following the trading violations and other con-
troversies engulfing the N.Y.S.E. of late. Kopin Tan, SEC Prods Exchanges to Step Up Enforce-
ment of Trading Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at C3.
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gence any time funds are received under the ordinary care standard. 33
Rule 405 requires securities intermediaries to perform due diligence in
order to ensure that funds are not misappropriated. 34
While the industry standard may require due diligence to prevent
misappropriation of funds, most states have passed laws superseding
any common law duty and liability.35 In the context of fiduciary trans-
fers of securities, most states have adopted various uniform statutes to
promote the transfer of securities by fiduciaries.36
Most commercial banks will perform a minimal background check
before accepting funds from an individual or company. In so doing,
the securities intermediary will often become aware of the underlying
trust agreement. With the knowledge that the funds are being held
under a trust agreement, the bank will thus have an obligation at com-
mon law to request a copy of the trust agreement. The bank will also
have an obligation not to perform any transactions which are known
to be in direct violation of the trust agreement's provisions.37
Most of the statutory safe harbors impose liability only when the
securities intermediary had some level of knowledge of the breach of
fiduciary duty in initiating the particular security transfer. The stat-
utes differ slightly in their breadth: some require constructive knowl-
edge of the breach of fiduciary duty versus actual knowledge to
impose liability. With "knowledge" being the basis for imposing lia-
bility, the focal point then becomes the duty of inquiry imposed on the
securities intermediaries.
A spectrum of inquiry duties has thus been created by the statutory
schemes. Under a statute requiring constructive knowledge, a bank
would have a duty of simple inquiry much like the common law duty.
Other statutes include a good faith requirement imposing a duty to
inquire further under circumstances of reasonable suspicion.38 At the
far end of the spectrum is protection for securities transfers unless the
33. In re Blech Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 1610775, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
34. N.Y.S.E. R. 405; see De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1310 (2d Cir.
2002) (use of Rule 405 as evidence of industry standard requiring due diligence accepted by the
court).
35. Unif. Fiduciaries Act §2, 7A U.L.A. 135 (1978) [hereinafter U.F.A.]; see also BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (Rev. 2d ed) § 905.
36. Id.
37. Hertz v. Record Pub. Co. of Erie, 105 F. Supp. 200, 201 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (no duty to
inquire into rightfulness simply because registered owner holding funds for a third); United
States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Royal Nat'l Bank of New York, 545 F.2d 1330, 1335 (2d Cir.
1976) (broker has no duty to inquire into rightfulness of order absent knowledge of suspicious
circumstances)
38. See, e.g., UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2C U.L.A. 267 (1994) [hereinafter U.C.C.].
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securities intermediary has actual knowledge of the breach of fiduci-
ary duty, which effectively eliminates any inquiry duty.
B. Uniform Fiduciaries Act (U.F.A.)
The U.F.A. was enacted to relieve securities intermediaries of the
common law duty of inquiry.39 As long as the securities intermediary
acts in good faith, the U.F.A. affords protection from liability stem-
ming from the breach of fiduciary duty.40 The U.F.A. protects a se-
curities intermediary or agent "who in good faith pays or transfers to a
fiduciary any money or other property which the fiduciary as such is
authorized to receive, is not responsible for the proper application
thereof by the fiduciary. 41 Furthermore, the payment or transfer
from fiduciaries to securities intermediaries and others "is not invalid
in consequence of a misapplication by the fiduciary. 42 The good faith
requirement, however, implicitly includes a duty to inquire into the
rightfulness of transfers.43 The good faith requirement, therefore,
provides a loophole in the safe harbor otherwise provided by the
U.F.A. for securities intermediaries without actual knowledge of the
trustee's breach.
Liability can only be imposed under the U.F.A. if the securities in-
termediary transferred the securities in bad faith or with actual knowl-
edge that the directive was in violation of the fiduciary's power.
44
Liability under the U.F.A. thus requires an allegation rising to the
same standard as an intentional tort.4 5 Actual knowledge requires an
awareness on the part of the securities intermediary that the fiduciary
is defrauding the principal and/or breaching his or her duty at the mo-
39. Rinehart v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 709 N.E.2d 559, 566 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (enact-
ment of the U.F.A. relieved banks of the common law duty of inquiry requiring banks to assure
that funds are properly applied).
40. See U.F.A., supra note 35.
41. Id.
42. Uniform Fiduciaries Act drafted in 1922.
43. Wetherill v. Bank IV Kansas, 145 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1998) (because bad faith includes
willful blindness and other situations where a reasonable person in the same circumstances
would have inquired into the rightfulness of the transfer).
44. Hosselton v. First Am. Bank, 240 Ill. App. 3d 903, 908 (1993) (requiring an allegation of
actual knowledge or bad faith to impose liability); cf. Manfredi v. Dauphin Deposit Bank, 697
A.2d 1025, 1029 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (must plead either actual knowledge or bad faith, such as
dishonest acts, and not mere negligence to plead beyond the protection of the U.F.A.).
45. An intentional tort requires that the "actor knows that consequences are certain, or sub-
stantially certain, to result from his act, and still does ahead" under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 8A cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added). Likewise, under the U.F.A., a claimant must allege
the actor had knowledge and still followed the instructions of the client.
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ment the transaction takes place.46 Although the U.F.A. utilizes an
actual knowledge standard, the requirement of good faith necessarily
lowers the standard to a constructive knowledge standard.47 The ex-
isting facts must be taken into account to determine if a bank, in exer-
cising ordinary care, would have a reasonable probability of
discovering the wrong being done.48 Under this standard, therefore, a
securities intermediary must inquire into the rightfulness of instruc-
tions where suspicious circumstances exist or the securities intermedi-
ary has reason to know that the instructions may be contrary to the
principal's fiduciary powers. If required to investigate, a bank will be
charged with heightened actual knowledge.
The purpose of the U.F.A. was to protect entities dealing in good
faith with fiduciaries.49 When drafting the U.F.A., an effort was made
to shift the burden of ensuring funds are properly applied from the
intermediary to the principal who selected the fiduciary. 50 By shifting
the burden to the principal, the U.F.A. aimed to increase the effi-
ciency of securities transfers and thus promote the effectiveness of
fiduciaries.
C. Further Statutory Protections
1. Revised Section 8-115 of the Uniform Commercial Code
A broker is not obliged to take risks on behalf of a customer.51 A
broker or bank, however, may be liable if it has constructive knowl-
edge that the trustee transactional order was improper. Section 8-115
of the U.C.C. states that a securities intermediary will generally be
liable for the a transfer of securities in breach of fiduciary duty if (1)
46. Continental Cas. Co., Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 768 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002).
47. Although the U.F.A. does not use the "constructive knowledge" language, bad faith has
often been found under circumstances akin to constructive knowledge. Willful blindness has
been found to be bad faith, which may amount to an imposition of a constructive knowledge
standard. Decker v. Yorkton Sec., Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing
Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. 343, 366-67 (1858) ("Every one must conduct himself honestly...
While he is not obliged to make inquiries, he must not willfully shut his eyes to the means of
knowledge which he knows are at hand.., for the reason that such conduct, whether equivalent to
notice or not, would be plenary evidence of bad faith.") (emphasis added)).
48. Id. (citing § 8105 cmt.4).
49. See Johnson v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Decatur, 334 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
50. UNR-Rohn, Inc. v. Summit Bank of Clinton County, 687 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997); see also County of Macon v. Edgcomb, 654 N.E.2d 598, 601 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (purpose
of U.F.A. to place the burden of selecting a proper fiduciary on the principal who selects the
fiduciary).
51. See First Am. Disc. Corp. v. Jacobs, 324 Il1. App. 3d 997 (2001) (citing Mohammed v. Jack
Carl/312 Futures, Index Futures Group, Inc., [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 38,665).
[Vol. 2:377
2004] INTERMEDIARIES HOLDING ASSETS 389
acting in opposition to a court directive or (2) acting in collusion.
52
Official Comment 1 to Section 8-115 indicates that this section deals
with the related problem of liability of "securities intermediaries-the
'conduits' in the indirect holding system-and brokers and other
agents or bailees-the 'conduits' in the direct holding system."
Under the second premise, liability will be imposed for acting in
collusion with the fiduciary in breach of the fiduciary duty.53 In sev-
eral cases, parties have argued for an expanded reading of the term
"collusion. '54 The Official Comment 5 to Section 8-115 indicates that
the "collusion test" should be interpreted according to the meaning of
"collusion" from the Restatement (2d) of Torts.55 There is little sup-
port for a broadened reading of "collusion" beyond this standard.
56
The securities intermediary, according to Comment 3, "should not be
placed in the position of having to make a legal judgment about the
validity of the claim at the risk of liability either to its customer or to
the third party for guessing wrong." The purpose of this section and
many of the other provisions under Article 8 of the U.C.C. is to grant
agents and organizations in the direct and indirect holding systems the
privilege to act on the instructions of customers unless it has been
served with a restraining order, its actions rise to the level of collusion,
or it acts in bad faith.57 The aim of Article 8 is to promote greater
52. U.C.C. § 8-115 (1994). This section, entitled Securities Intermediary and Others Not Lia-
ble to Adverse Claimant, states:
A securities intermediary that has transferred a financial asset pursuant to an effective
entitlement order, or a broker or other agent or bailee that has dealt with a financial
asset at the direction of its customer or principal, is not liable to a person having an
adverse claim to the financial asset, unless the securities intermediary, or broker or
other agent or bailee:
(1) took the action after it had been served with an injunction, restraining order, or
other legal process enjoining it from doing so, issued by a court of competent juris-
diction, and had reasonable opportunity to act on the injunction, restraining order,
or other legal process; or
(2) acted in collusion with the wrongdoer in violating the rights of the adverse claim-
ant; or
(3) in the case of a security certificate that has been stolen, acted with notice of the
adverse claim.
Id.
53. See U.C.C. § 8-115, cmt.5.
54. Hosselton v. First Am. Bank, 608 N.E.2d 630, 634 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993).
55. U.C.C. § 8-115, supra note 52, cmt.5.
56. Official comment 3 states that this section provides protection even where the securities
intermediary has notice or knowledge of an adverse claim. In order to promote the settlement
of securities transfers, liability will not depend on notice or knowledge of adverse claims.
57. Comment 3 to Section 8-115 states the overall purpose of this section as relieving securi-
ties intermediaries and agents in the indirect and direct holding system of the fear of liability for
acting on the instructions of a client where an adverse claim exists. Comment 2 states that the
"policy of this section is similar to that of many other rules of law that protect agents and bailees
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efficiency in settlement of securities transfers by relieving entities in
the direct and indirect holding system of having to make judgment as
to claims between their clients and third parties. 58
In addition to the "collusion test," the U.C.C. also includes a re-
quirement of good faith.59 Bad faith has been defined as suspicion
that a fiduciary is acting improperly and deliberately refraining from
investigating to avoid actual knowledge of a fiduciary's breach of
duty.60 Most bad faith actions, however, will be encompassed by the
"collusion test," which covers the typical bad faith acts, such as willful
blindness.
61
Given the protection afforded by Section 8-115, securities in-
termediaries are thus relieved of a duty to inquire into adverse claims
on funds held by clients. 62 Under the "collusion test," however, secur-
ities intermediaries will also have to perform a good faith inquiry
when receiving instructions from clients.
63
2. Revised Sections 8-401, 402, 403 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
Revised Section 8-115 provides protection to securities in-
termediaries dealing with fiduciaries. In understanding Section 8-115,
however, the other sections of Chapter 8 of the U.C.C. provide a fur-
ther context for interpretation. 64 Moreover, the revisions to these sec-
tions may provide an understanding of the purpose and intent of
Section 8-115, which was only added in a later revision of Article 8.
As discussed, Section 8-115 pertains to securities intermediaries hold-
ing funds for fiduciary clients. The other provisions provide safe
harbors for similarly situated entities effectuating transfers.
from liability as innocent converters." (emphasis added). Similar to general tort law, the purpose
of this section is to protect agents and bailees from liability when acting properly on the instruc-
tions of their clients or bailors.
58. See U.C.C. § 8-115, cmt.1.
59. Iwtmm, Inc. v. Forest Hills Rest Home, 577 S.E.2d 175, 179 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (courts
permitted to read requirement of good faith into U.C.C.); see also Falk v. N. Trust Co., 327 I11.
App. 3d 101,110 (2001).
60. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 1997 WL 428515, *5 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
61. Id.
62. See Official Comments to § 8-115.
63. Id.
64. U.C.C. Section 8-115 includes substantial official comment to explain the purpose of the
section and give further explanation for its intended application. The comments include several
factual example situations. Though the comments to Section 8-115 make the meaning of the
section relatively clear, a full understanding of the section can only be properly had by relating




The prior version of Section 8-403 specified that if an issuer had
written notice of an adverse claim it would have to inquire into the
claim by reasonable means. 65 It could discharge its inquiry duty by
notifying the adverse claimant that the transfer would be registered
unless the adverse claimant obtained a court order or gave an indem-
nity bond.
66
The Revised Article 8 amends the principle of liability by protecting
the transferring agent against liability unless acting against a court di-
rective or in collusion with the breaching fiduciary. The Revised Arti-
cle 8 does not impose a duty of inquiry when simply given notice of an
adverse claim.67 The former Section 8-403(3) was therefore no longer
necessary to negate the inference of constructive knowledge based
merely on notice of an adverse claim.68 The revised section purport-
edly provides a higher standard than constructive knowledge.
Under the current Revised Chapter 8, notice of an adverse claim
does not impose actual knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty; how-
ever, knowledge that a client is acting in the capacity of a fiduciary can
impose a duty to inquire into the adverse claim.69 If a bank knows
that a client is acting in the capacity of a fiduciary, under the rules of
good faith, it must request a copy of the fiduciary agreement to assure
that it informs itself of the extent of the fiduciary's powers. The bank,
therefore, still has a duty of inquiry when it has even the mere knowl-
edge that a client is acting as a fiduciary.
The current standard for liability under the U.C.C. seems to be on
the basis of what the holder should know or negligently failed to un-
cover. Those who refuse to investigate will be imputed with actual
knowledge.
Section 8-403 can be read as providing support for the argument
that the inquiry duty should generally be triggered by the knowledge
of the transferor of a breach of a fiduciary duty (by the client) rather
than knowledge of an adverse claim (by a third party). Section 8-
403(2) states that "the fact that the issuer has notice that the regis-
tered owner holds the security... in the name of a fiduciary does not
create a duty of inquiry into the rightfulness of the transfer. If, how-
ever, the issuer ... has reason to know that such proceeds are being
used or that the transaction is for the individual benefit of the fiduci-
65. Former U.C.C. § 8-403.
66. See U.C.C. § 8-403 and comments thereto.
67. U.C.C. § 8 (no duty to inquire is imposed based merely on an adverse claim).
68. Donald J. Rapson, The Emerged and Emerging New Uniform Commercial Code, C878
ALI-ABA 183 (1993).
69. See U.C.C. § 8-115. See generally U.C.C. § 8.
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ary, the issuer is under a duty to inquire into the rightfulness of the
transfer. ' 70 Article 8 of the U.C.C. can thus be read as usurping the
common law duty of due diligence in all circumstances and limiting
the inquiry duty to cases where the securities intermediary has reason-
able suspicion of the rightfulness of clients' instructions.
71
In light of the higher standard in the other sections and the mention
of actual knowledge, Section 8-115's constructive knowledge standard
stands as an anomaly. A possible explanation for this may be that it
strikes a compromise between the good faith principles of the U.C.C.
and the trend towards affording financial institutions greater
protection.
3. Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Securities
Transfers (U.A.S.F.S.A.)
"Whereas the responsibility of a corporation to inquire into the pro-
priety of transfers of their shares is an anomaly never included in the
common law and equity of England. .. whereas this responsibility is
anachronistic in light of the modern rule of negotiability of shares..."
an "actual knowledge" or "bad faith" is appropriate to eliminate the
imposition of duty based simply on notice of adverse claim from
U.C.C.72 At the time of adoption of the U.A.S.F.S.T., many corpora-
tions appeared to be adhering to burdensome documentation and ig-
noring the U.F.A. to assure protection based on the then-existing 1947
U.C.C. standard; therefore, the N.C.C.U.S.L. felt the need for an addi-
tional statute protecting corporations. 73 The U.A.S.F.S.T. strength-
ened the protection of intermediaries to eliminate the need for such
preventative actions that were not intended to be required under the
U.F.A.
Many of the provisions of the U.A.S.F.S.T. and similar statutes are
identical or similar to those of the prior version of the U.C.C.; al-
though, most states retained the U.A.S.F.S.T. and similar statutes.7
4
The protection of the U.A.S.F.S.T., however, supersedes the U.F.A.
and prior U.C.C. The duty of inquiry imposed by the U.A.S.F.S.T. is
narrower than that of even the prior U.C.C. because the U.A.S.F.S.T.
allows securities intermediaries to assume fiduciaries are acting prop-
70. U.C.C. § 8-403(2).
71. Other sections of Article 8 including for example § 8-304 specifically limit the duty of
inquiry into the rightfulness of transfer instructions or adverse claims.
72. See UNIF. ACT FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS, 7C U.L.A. 332
(1958) [hereinafter U.A.S.F.S.T.].
73. Id.
74. Rapson, supra note 68.
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erly except in the narrow circumstances specified in the specific stat-
ute of the adopting jurisdiction.75 Generally, a securities intermediary
will be protected under the U.A.S.F.S.T. unless it had actual knowl-
edge of the breach of fiduciary duty at the time of executing the
transaction.
4. Uniform Trust Powers Act (U.T.P.A.)
Fifteen states have adopted a form of the U.T.P.A.. The U.T.P.A.
expands the powers of trustees and promotes trustee self-regulation
over trustor monitoring. 76 In the event that a trustee is in breach the
trustor will often look to the wealthy third-party bank. This circum-
stance happens more often than thought because trustees usually do
not have nearly as much capital as banks unless they are part of a
large bank or insurance company. Many trustees still act on their own
as individual companies and not part of a bank. In such cases, the
trustee often may not be able to satisfy the judgment and the third
party bank becomes the sole defendant. Thus, in cases of breach, the
U.T.P.A. does as much for third-party intermediaries in the case of
trust bankruptcy as it does for trustees properly administering a work-
ing trust.
The U.T.P.A. serves as the linchpin for protection of banks because
the protection afforded by the U.T.P.A. is broader than that of the
U.F.A. and Common Law.77 Under the U.T.P.A., securities in-
termediaries do not have a duty to inquire into whether trustees are
exercising their powers properly.78 The U.T.P.A. does not provide
protection if the securities intermediary has actual knowledge of the
breach of fiduciary duty, meaning, protection extends to in-
termediaries without actual knowledge of the breach.
79
75. See U.A.S.F.S.T., 7C U.L.A. 332 (1958).
76. "A third person, without actual knowledge of breach of trust, dealing with the trustee is
protected." UNrF. TRUSTEES' POWERS AcT, 7C U.L.A. 388 (1964) (emphasis added). Similar to
the U.F.A., the U.T.P.A. also extends the powers of trustees. Under the U.T.P.A., the trustee
has any power not expressly restricted in the trust agreement as well as the power to carry out
permissible acts listed. See Jason L. Smith, Stegemeier v. Magness, An Analysis of a Trustee's
Fiduciary Duty in Self-Interested Transactions, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 605, 623 (2000). All
powers within the U.T.P.A. are within the power of the trustee. Id. A trustee, however, must
seek court approval if an action poses a potential conflict of interest. Id. at 624.
77. The U.T.P.A. incorporates solely an actual knowledge standard whereas the other statutes
utilize a constructive knowledge standard or good faith at least in the alternative. See U.T.P.A.,
7C U.L.A. 388 (1964).
78. Wetherill, II v. Bank IV Kansas, 1997 WL 94255, *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 1997) (third person
without actual knowledge that trustee is acting beyond his or her powers is protected by the
U.T.P.A.).
79. See U.T.P.A., 7C U.L.A. 388 (1964); see also Wetherill, 1997 WL 94255 at *3.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Current Level of Protection
Today, the financial system in the United States is heavily regulated.
The duties required by these regulatory agencies stand in addition to
those of the common law and state statutory laws. Table 2 lists some
of the major regulatory agencies involved in the US financial system.
Most of these agencies oversee the business of firms in financial mar-
kets and/or impose specific duties. There is little interaction between
these regulatory agencies with the issues discussed in this article.
Generally, the duties imposed by exchange rules and regulatory agen-
cies serve as evidence for interpreting reasonableness at common
law.8
0
TABLE 2 THE PRINCIPAL REGULATORY AGENCIES IN THE US
8 1
Agency Scope
Securities & Exchange Commission Exchanges and financial markets
Federal Reserve All depository institutions
State Banking and Insurance
Commissions State depository institutions
Federal Deposit Insurance
Companies Banks, mutual funds, etc.
Office of the Comptroller of the Federally chartered commercial
Currency banks
Commodities Futures and Trading Federally chartered commercial
Commission banks
National Credit Union
Administration Federally chartered credit unions
At common law, as discussed above, banks have a duty to investi-
gate adverse claims. The U.F.A., drafted in 1922, has been adopted by
26 states.8 2 The U.A.S.F.S.T. was drafted in 1958. It has been
adopted by 24 states.83 While the U.F.A. aimed to protect corpora-
tions dealing with trustees, many corporations adhered to the com-
mon law inquiry and documentation duty to assure that they would
not be exposed to liability.84 The drafters apparently believed that the
standard set forth in the U.F.A. needed to be broadened and clarified
in order to eliminate the need for what it felt was excessive documen-
80. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. FREDERIC MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 43
(6th ed. Update Addison-Wesley 2003).
82. See Table of Adopting Jurisdictions, 7A U.L.A. 135 (1978).
83. See Table of Adopting Jurisdictions, 7C U.L.A. 332 (1958).
84. See 7C U.L.A. 332 (1958).
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tation.85 Part of the reason for corporations adhering to the common
law duty of inquiry and documentation was the ambiguity of the then-
existing Chapter 8 of the U.C.C. At that time, the U.C.C. imposed a
duty of inquiry based on knowledge where knowledge could be im-
puted when the holding company had notice of an adverse claim.
86
Now that Chapter 8 of the U.C.C. has been revised and Section 8-115
has further been added, there is little need for the U.A.S.F.S.T. .87
Therefore, in states that adopted the revised U.C.C. and simply did
not repeal the U.A.S.F.S.T., the U.A.S.F.S.T. is not applicable. 88
The U.T.P.A. has been drafted to increase the flexibility in the exer-
cise of investment power attendant upon trustees by raising the level
of protection to that of prudent man rule investment statutes. 89 The
U.T.P.A., drafted in 1964, has been adopted by 16 states.90 The
U.T.P.A. provides the broadest protection. 91
The U.T.P.A., however, does not necessarily control. Whereas the
U.F.A. and U.T.P.A. were drafted many years ago, the U.C.C. has
gone through constant revisions and will be continually revised. 92
Likewise, Section 8-115 is the most recent statute related to this sub-
ject matter. 93 It is also the most widely accepted given its inclusion in
the U.C.C.
B. The Trend
Revised Article 8 has only been adopted in the late 1990's and thus
has not played a significant role in the courts until the last few years.
The revision of Article 8 shows the trend towards expanding the pro-
tection of parties in financial markets in order to increase the effi-
ciency of markets.94
85. Id.
86. See U.C.C. § 8-115.
87. See Nutter, supra note 7. All the states that adopted the U.A.S.F.S.T. have since repealed
the statutes except for Louisiana and Washington D.C.
88. See prefatory note to U.C.C. revision stating that after the revision of the U.C.C., the
U.A.S.F.S.T. becomes redundant and expressly inapplicable; see also Rapson, supra note 68.
89. See U.T.P.A., 7C U.L.A. 388 (1964).
90. See Table of Adopting Jurisdictions, 7C U.L.A. 388 (1964).
91. Actual knowledge rather than good faith or constructive knowledge.
92. Revised Article 8 of the U.C.C. was drafted in 1977. Section 8-115 has been adopted by
all jurisdictions including the District of Columbia and Virgin Islands. No cases have yet had the
chance to fully interpret Section 8-115.
93. Section 8-115 was drafted in 1994. The U.T.P.A. predates even the revised Chapter 8 of
the U.C.C. drafted in 1977.
94. Robert A. Wittie, Recent Case Law Developments in U.C.C. Article 8 and Investment Se-
curities, 54 Bus. LAW. 1921 (1999).
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The trend has been to enact laws providing more protection for se-
curities intermediaries doing business with fiduciaries and shifting the
burden onto beneficiaries. The U.F.A. relieved banks holding funds
for fiduciaries of the common law duty.95 The U.A.S.F.S.T. expanded
this protection to assure banks that they would not be liable in the
case of notice of adverse claims. 96 The U.T.P.A. increased the scope
of protection even further by only allowing a cause of action where a
bank had actual knowledge of the breach of fiduciary duty.
97
The U.C.C., revised later in 1977, included several safe harbor sec-
tions with regards to different transactions.98 Section 8-115, drafted in
1994, maintains the typical constructive knowledge and good faith
standards of the U.C.C.99 Section 8-115, however, does not indicate a
retreat from the actual knowledge standard of the U.T.P.A. . Section
8-115 does not make any reference to the U.T.P.A. . Nonetheless, it
mentions an actual knowledge standard and only the U.C.C. good
faith requirement also included serves to limit its scope. Therefore, it
is unclear whether the drafters of the Section 8-115 intended to assure
a constructive knowledge standard in place of the actual knowledge
standard of the U.T.P.A. .100
In the twentieth century, American law moved away from imposi-
tion of liability on issuers for registering transfers ordered by regis-
tered owners held to be acting wrongfully towards beneficiaries. 10
Several statutes, as discussed above, were enacted to eliminate delays
in securities transfers that hinder fiduciaries' ability to serve benefi-
ciaries' interests.'
0 2
Professor Wendel and others argue that perhaps the drafters of the
U.T.P.A. did not intend to go so far as the literal language suggests.
0 3
Professor Wendel notes that the common law recognized both negli-
gent inquiry and intentional bad faith.1°4 In their articles, Professor
95. See Unif. Fiduciaries Act §2, 7A U.L.A. 135 (1978).
96. See U.A.S.F.S.T., 7C U.L.A. 332 (1958); see also supra Section A.
97. See U.T.P.A., 7C U.L.A. 388 (1964).
98. Chapter 8 of the U.C.C. deal broadly with business dealings. Several of the sections pro-
vide safe harbors with regards to depository institutions and check-writing and purchases for
value. Only Section 8-115 deals specifically with fiduciaries and securities intermediaries.
99. See U.C.C. § 8-115.
100. The drafting of statutes by the NCCUSL typically does not include the same documenta-
tion as state or federal legislation drafting. Moreover, due to the fact that the uniform statutes
were drafted many decades ago, little in the way of drafting history was available in interpreting
these model statutes today.
101. See Rapson, supra note 68.
102. Id. (discussing enactment of uniform statutes protecting securities intermediaries dis-
cussed above).




Wendel and Mr. Curtis argue that prior uniform acts retained inten-
tional bad faith as a basis for imposing liability, but exonerated issuers
shown to have acted negligently. 10 5 The actual knowledge standard of
the U.T.P.A., however, is clear. Professor Wendel is correct to note
that prior statutes retained the constructive knowledge standard for
imputing knowledge on banks and agents who intentionally refuse to
inquire. 1°6 Nonetheless, the trend, has been to increase protection for
banks and agents dealing with fiduciaries in order to make processing
of transaction orders more efficient. The U.T.P.A. only moves one
step further from the constructive knowledge standard. After several
decades and an explosion in the financial industry, the U.T.P.A. is a
logical step further.
Curtis also argues that an actual knowledge standard "frustrates the
intentions of settlors by making it impossible to create a trust that
would force third parties to exercise that degree of care they would
undoubtedly display in other contexts."'01 7 Curtis argues that treating
third parties as good faith purchasers even when they ignore signs that
trustees are acting ultra vires creates unjust results.10 8 Normally the
banks and agents would exercise a degree of care comparable to that
exercised under an actual knowledge standard. This still imposes a
duty to provide the care to be expected and precludes disregard of
wrongful conduct by the trustee. In the case of dealings with non-
fiduciary clients, the worry of rightfulness of transactions and powers
of the client are not present. The bank must only assure that it does
not act in collusion with a client acting wrongfully.
Curtis suggests that the drafters may not have intended this re-
sult. 10 9 The language of the U.T.P.A. does not contain any ambiguity.
There does not seem to be any indication that a good faith require-
ment was unintentionally omitted either. 110 Rather, the omission of
the good faith requirement may be seen as an intentional desire to
assure that banks and agents have no investigative burden given in-
creasingly complex and fast-paced financial transactions.
105. Id.
106. Id. The U.F.A., U.A.S.F.S.T., and U.C.C. all contain good faith requirements and/or
constructive knowledge standards barring issuers from being shielded under facts supporting
willful blindness.
107. Curtis, supra note 13, at 251 (arguing that the actual knowledge standard of the U.T.P.A.
goes too far in relieving securities issuers of liability).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 307-08 (arguing the drafters may not have intended to let issuers shield themselves
from liability by deliberately failing to investigate).
110. Charles Horowitz, chairman of the committee that drafted the U.T.P.A., argued that the
elimination of the constructive knowledge standard is necessary for trusts to be efficiently ad-
ministered. Id. at 304.
2004]
398 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
The result of an actual knowledge standard cannot be said to be
entirely unjust since the U.T.P.A. actually allows banks to put their
faith in fiduciary-clients in whom third party settlors have already in-
vested their faith. The burden has shifted further onto the settlor to
assure that the fiduciary selected will act in conformance with his or
her status and the powers with which he or she has been entrusted.
The trust with which the fiduciary has accepted are of the highest or-
der and it cannot be argued unjust to allow others to thus rely on this
relationship as well, especially given the fact that the beneficiaries are
the ones who benefit from more efficient transaction processing. The
beneficiaries may still disengage themselves from the administration,
but they should still be required to show at least some interest in
choosing the trustee wisely."' The law is not meant to allow benefi-
ciaries to choose trustees frivolously.
Furthermore, in a historical context, the U.T.P.A. actual knowledge
standard is arguably the broadest and latest in the series of model
statutes affording a safe harbor to securities intermediaries holding
funds for fiduciaries. 112 Of the separate uniform laws mentioned
above involving securities intermediaries, the U.T.P.A. is the broadest
and most recent. Section 8-115 of the U.C.C. incorporates a good
faith standard foreclosing willful blindness as opposed to the U.T.P.A.
actual knowledge standard.
Nonetheless, Section 8-115 serves as an investment security rule
within the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 8-115 can be seen as a
compromise between the timidly accepted U.T.P.A. and the widely
accepted U.C.C., which includes a good faith requirement throughout.
Had the rule been drafted standing on its own, one cannot be certain
that it would have incorporated the collusion test as opposed to an
actual knowledge standard. 1 3
In fact, given the other uniform laws relating to securities in-
termediaries, the good faith safe harbor would be superfluous. As
mentioned above, Section 8-115 even includes an actual knowledge
111. See Bennet, supra note 20, for more information on balancing the loss of fiduciary agent
errors between the fiduciary and beneficiary.
112. The U.T.P.A. was drafted in 1964 and sU.C.C.eeded drafting of the U.F.A. (1922) and
U.A.S.F.S.T. (1958) discussed above. Section 8-115 of the U.C.C., however, was just very re-
cently added in 1996 but deals with a broader and relatively different subject matter than the
U.F.A., U.A.S.F.S.T., and U.T.P.A.. It should also be noted that the U.F.A., U.A.S.F.S.T., and
U.T.P.A. deal with the powers of trustee-fiduciaries whereas the U.C.C. focuses on business
transactions. Section 8-115 focuses specifically on placing orders by fiduciaries simpler for secur-
ities intermediaries for the benefit of the market; the U.F.A., U.A.S.F.S.T., and U.T.P.A. aim to
make the transactions simpler in order to make the fiduciary more effective. See above for
specific underlying purposes of U.C.C., U.F.A., and U.A.S.F.S.T..
113. Section 8-115 was added as a new section on its own after the latest revision of Article 8.
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standard. Given the inclusion of the U.C.C. good faith, however, the
actual knowledge standard becomes meaningless. Section 8-115
seems to allow the possibility that at some point in the future the con-
structive knowledge and good faith language may be deleted. As a
rule of statutory interpretation, a statute should not be interpreted so
as to make it redundant. In this respect, the U.T.P.A. stands as the
last in a line of uniform laws relating to intermediaries and fiduciary
clients. Thus, the trend appears to be granting broader protection
rather than narrowing the protection already afforded under more
widely-adopted, older model statutes.
C. The Necessity of Uniformity
Currently, there is a lack of uniformity in provisions adopted by the
states." 4 In some states, a complainant must show an adverse third
party was acting for personal gain or in furtherance of his or her own
financial advantage in order to have the right to sue a third party for
participating in a breach of fiduciary duty. 115 Most states provide a
constructive knowledge standard for protection of securities in-
termediaries holding funds for fiduciaries. A small number of states
adhere to the onerous common law standard in conjunction with ex-
change rules and other industry standards. A small number of states
also have adopted the broader actual knowledge standard. Some
states have adopted all the statutes discussed and failed to repeal prior
versions. Some states have only adopted the U.C.C. All the jurisdic-
tions have adopted at least one of the uniform statutes. For this rea-
son, it is often difficult for banks doing business in each state to
determine the standard for imposing liability when dealing with
trustees.
Even if a bank is aware of which model codes have been adopted, it
cannot always be sure of the applicable standard. For example, a
bank may not always be so sure of the duty of inquiry in a particular
114. Fifteen states have adopted the U.T.P.A. . Forty-four states have adopted the U.C.C.
The 2000 revision of Article 8 and Section 8-115 has been adopted substantially by all fifty states,
the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the U.F.A..
115. Restatement Second Trusts § 326, cmt. a., 124 (No liability on the part of an agent effec-
tuating a transactions unless the agent had knowledge of the breach of fiduciary duty); see e.g.,
Certain Defendants v. Lucas & Co., 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6966 (California appellate
court affirming summary judgment for defendant where defendant accountant could not be
shown to have gained personally nor personally involved with the breach of fiduciary duty); see
also In re Cooper, Inc., 2000 WL 1664167, *9, (Del. Ch. 2000) (agent acting as intermediary may
be liable if participating in the wrongful transaction and unjustly enriched as a result of the
transaction).
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state where the legislature has adopted the U.F.A. but not the
U.T.P.A. or Section 8-115 of the U.C.C.116
In the opposite case where the legislature has adopted all the stat-
utes, a bank may also be unsure of whether the actual knowledge of
the U.T.P.A. or the constructive knowledge of Section 8-115 of the
U.C.C. controls. 11 7 In such instances, the statute adopted last will typ-
ically control; however, the order of adoption may be due to factors
other than the actual intent of the legislature.
11 8
In Wetherill v. Bank IV Kansas a Kansas court held that no cause of
action existed under Kansas's Uniform Trustees' Powers Act without a
showing of actual knowledge where a plaintiff attempted to proceed
under the common law standard and U.C.C. constructive knowledge
standard.' 19 The court in Wetherill stated that "a fundamental premise
of statutory construction is that a specific statute dealing with a sub-
ject controls over the general statute on the subject, unless it appears
the legislature intended the general act to control. ' 120 Thus, a bank
holding funds for a fiduciary client cannot be sure if what the standard
for imposing liability will be in states that have adopted the U.T.P.A.
and U.C.C. Similar to what happened when the U.F.A. was adopted,
rather than following the latest U.T.P.A. standard, banks will have
every incentive to adhere to the constructive knowledge standard to
the detriment of the service of the fiduciary in order to lessen expo-
sure to liability.
In contrast to the territorial variation of the standard, many securi-
ties intermediaries operate transnationally and even globally. In this
respect, the inconsistency of statutory protection increases the unpre-
dictability of outcomes for securities intermediaries operating on a
116. As mentioned above in Section II, under the U.F.A., it is not entirely clear that banks
will protecting from liability under the common law when given notice of an adverse claim to the
funds.
117. Wiley v. Toppings, 556 S.E.2d 818, 820 (W. Va. 2001) (when two enactments conflict,
courts generally follow the black-letter principle that "effect should always be given to the latest
•.. expression of the legislative will") (citing Joseph Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder, 56 W. Va.
602, 608 (1904)); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 313 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (courts should
credit "the latest expression of legislative will" when existing law conflicts) (citing St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Surdam, 595 A.2d 264 (Vt. 1991)).
118. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 313 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (in the case of conflicting
statutes, the later statute will control). As a hypothetical, the legislature may simply adopt the
model statutes as scheduling permits. The legislature in adopting the U.T.P.A. may intend to
have an actual knowledge standard yet create ambiguity by adoption of the Revised Chapter 8 of
the U.C.C. In such an example, the legislature may simply have intended to adopt Chapter 8 of
the U.C.C. without changing the application of the U.T.P.A.. Though only a hypothetical, given
the conditions of modern legislative bodies, such a situation is not implausible.
119, 145 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1998).
120, Id. at 1193.
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large scale and a disincentive to expansion in some states. Not only
will securities intermediaries need to investigate which model statutes
have been adopted, but they will often have to invest considerable
funds to determine the applicable standard.
As an example, the U.A.S.F.S.T., one of the earliest uniform stat-
utes dealing with securities intermediaries and fiduciaries, currently
conflicts with some of the newer uniform statutes. 121 In particular, the
principles set out in the U.A.S.F.S.T. statutes are almost identical to
those of the prior Article 8 of the U.C.C. and therefore not consistent
with the Revised Article 8 of the U.C.C.122 The prior Article 8 of the
U.C.C. and the U.A.S.F.S.T. and other similar statutes base liability
on notice of an adverse claim; the revised version of the U.C.C. condi-
tions liability on constructive knowledge of breach of fiduciary duty or
acting in opposition to a court order. Under the Revised Article 8, the
third party should not and is not required to interfere in the relation-
ship between the fiduciary and beneficiary. The U.A.S.F.S.T., how-
ever, is an old provision and likely has been superseded by newer
statutes in the states in which it has been adopted. Many state legisla-
tures have specifically repealed the statute although the U.A.S.F.S.T.
still remains in force in some jurisdictions. 123 For this reason, the
U.A.S.F.S.T. does not normally apply, but it provides a background
for determining the intent of the drafters of later statutory
protections.
As discussed in Section B, adoption of the Revised Chapter 8 of the
U.C.C. should not necessarily be interpreted to repeal the actual
knowledge standard of the U.T.P.A.. Due to the constant revisions of
the U.C.C., an adopting legislature may not take the care to specifi-
cally single out the situation of securities intermediaries dealing with
fiduciaries every time it adopts a new revision of the U.C.C.124
The requirement of good faith runs through the entire U.C.C.;
therefore, specific modification with regard to dealing with fiduciaries
may undermine the practicality of the U.C.C. A more practical solu-
tion would be adoption of the U.T.P.A. actual knowledge standard by
all states. If the U.T.P.A. were adopted uniformly, the standard
would clearly be actual knowledge when dealing with fiduciaries and
121. Nutter, supra note 7.
122. See U.A.S.F.S.T., 7C U.L.A. 332 (1958); U.C.C. Chapter 8. See also Nutter, supra note 7.
123. The U.A.S.F.S.T. has been repealed in all jurisdictions other than Louisiana and Wash-
ington D.C.
124. The first revision of the U.C.C. was in 1997 and Section 8-115 was drafted in 1994. Peri-
odic revisions of the U.C.C. have been made over the years and will likely continue as the com-
mercial business environment continues to change.
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good faith (or constructive knowledge) when dealing with others and
for other types of commercial dealings.
A uniform actual knowledge standard among the states would elim-
inate the risk of potential liability and provide clarity in determining
the available protection. Failure to adopt a uniform standard leaves
the courts to decipher complex, often overlapping and seemingly
never-ending number of laws in order to determine the level of pro-
tection. Currently, the afforded protection and duty imposed on an
intermediary depends on geographic happenstance rather than careful
analysis and general consensus.
The recent consolidation of the retail banking industry adds to the
confusion now that most banks operate nationally in dozens of states
with respect to both the commercial and retail operations. The con-
flicts of law analysis itself has become so confusing that it is often
more efficient for parties to perform an analysis for a couple of the
most likely governing jurisdictions and leave the actual determination
for the court.
The notes in the Uniform Commercial Code and other uniform laws
express the desirability of avoiding second-guessing in any transaction.
The current asynchronous standards do just that. The banking indus-
try serves as a foundation for the entire economy and any effect felt
by the banking industry due to this confusion will likely ripple
throughout the economy. Thus, there is a heightened need for pre-
dictability and regularity in these particular banking and commercial
transactions.
D. Justification for an Actual Knowledge Standard125
Because fiduciaries owe the highest duty of care to beneficiaries,
the liability of third-party banks usually becomes important in in-
stances when the fiduciary is judgment proof.126 However, a broker,
as opposed to a trustee-fiduciary, generally does not have a fiduciary
125. See also Subsection III.B.
126. In the event of a loss of the funds, the fiduciary will obviously be the first one to whom
the beneficiary will look having been the one with control over the funds. Moreover, the fiduci-
ary owes the highest duty to the beneficiary and can therefore be subject to even greater liability.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928) ("Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."); cf. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d
9, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (when a trustee is not acting in his or her own interest, the duty of care
"standard fixed for his behavior is only that of a reasonable degree of care, skill, and caution.
But when the trustee acts in his own interest in connection with the performance of his duties as
trustee, the standard of behavior becomes more rigorous. In such a case his interest must yield to
that of the beneficiaries.").
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duty to his or her client unless the client has entrusted the broker to
act on his or her behalf in selecting investments. 127 "The duty of care
owed by a broker carrying a nondiscretionary account is an exceed-
ingly narrow one, consisting at most of a duty to properly carry out
transactions ordered by the customer. ' 128 If the broker is not acting
as a fiduciary, its duties will thus be limited to taking orders, executing
trades, and dealing with customer funds. 129 Nonetheless, under these
circumstances, when the beneficiary has lost his or her funds, the only
recourse left may be an action against the bank that was holding the
funds.
Though securities intermediaries do not have any contact with
third-party beneficiaries other than effectuating transactions for the
indirect benefit of beneficiaries, current laws in almost all states allow
holding companies and agents to be held liable for the full amount of
the funds lost. Bad faith and/or constructive knowledge of a fiduciary
client's breach of duty are the typical standards for imposing liability
as opposed to the broker or securities intermediary's own acts of neg-
ligence or intentional wrongdoing.
Imposing anything less than an actual knowledge standard holds
banks and agents dealing with fiduciaries to a liability where it would
not reasonably be expected simply on the basis of the heightened duty
of care owed by the client to the third party. A bank holding funds for
various clients might reasonably expect to owe the same duty of care
to all clients regardless of the individual business dealings of clients.
130
In essence, clients serving as fiduciaries increase the risk to banks
and impose a de facto heightened standard. Normally, if a bank acts
with ordinary care, it will not be subject to liability unless it is advising
the client or operating a discretionary account. 13' A typical account
will consist of funds under the ownership and control of a single entity
or group. A trust account for a fiduciary, however, has a natural tie to
another unrelated party-the beneficiary. Moreover, in the more
127. See In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1016 (2000).
128. Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Ross, 199 Ill. App. 3d 468, 475 (1990); see also Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Heritage Capital Advisory Services, Ltd., 823 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir.
1987) ("Only a broker operating a discretionary account - in which the broker determines which
investments to make - is viewed as a fiduciary").
129. See First Am. Disc. Corp. v. Jacobs, 324 IUl. App. 3d 997, 1012 (2001) (citing Ross, 557
N.E.2d at 348).
130. The USA Patriot Act might now be an exception to this argument if interpreted to im-
pose a duty on banks to freeze funds or report clients that might be linked to terrorist activities.
In such a circumstance, as opposed to ordinary care, banks would be required to investigate
dealings and named owner of each and every client account and affirmatively act if suspicious of
certain activities.
131. See supra notes 13 and 14.
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common instance of a non-fiduciary client, the question of the power
to direct funds is avoided or at least more readily answered. For ex-
ample, if a single individual made unwise investments, the loss would
lie with the client at fault. If the account, however, had been opened
by a fiduciary, the beneficiary will certainly look to anyone and every-
one to recover the lost funds. Assuming the bank at least knew that
the client was acting as a fiduciary, the bank will have had to take
precautions in case the entitlement orders by the fiduciary exceeded
the scope of his or her powers.
It is readily apparent that banks will have to take greater precau-
tions with some clients versus others, but in the case of a client acting
as a fiduciary, there is no economic justification. The market provides
banks with an economic incentive to hold a large amount of funds for
more particularly demanding clients with complex accounts. Clearly a
bank benefits financially from large transactions for a Fortune 1000
company or holding large deposits for institutional investors. A fidu-
ciary client poses a more unique situation where the bank exposes
itself to greater risk and must devote more resources for care of the
account than a similarly situated non-fiduciary individual account; yet,
the bank does not receive any economic reward. The bank will not
receive a risk premium for the risk of holding assets for fiduciaries.
The law has created an imbalance by subjecting holders of funds for
fiduciaries to greater risk without any corresponding benefit. A safe
harbor thus provides a balance to ensure the presence of banks willing
to hold these funds.
The real issue then becomes what should be the extent of the statu-
tory safe harbor. A low standard would not provide enough of an
incentive for banks to enter the market for holding funds for fiducia-
ries. The default standard, as discussed above, typically tends to be
based on good faith efforts or reasonable care without constructive
knowledge of the breach of fiduciary duty.
Most of the uniform statutes have been based on a slightly different
reasoning. The uniform statutes drafted by the N.C.C.U.S.L. began
with a focus on making transactions ordered by fiduciaries more effi-
cient for the benefit of the fiduciary. Prior to drafting of the U.F.A.,
all the way back to 1921, Professor Scott noted the onus imposed on
trustees dealing with commercial paper under the traditional rules.132
The U.F.A. reflected the views of Professor Scott and others in afford-
ing protection to securities intermediaries holding funds for fiduciaries
132. See generally Curtis, supra note 13.
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as those holding funds for other clients.133 As Professor Scott argued,
the U.F.A. provides protection unless the securities intermediary has
actual knowledge of the breach or acts in bad faith.134 Professor
Charles Horowitz, chairman of the drafting committee of the
U.T.P.A., argued that the "efficient administration of trusts requires
repudiation of constructive notice of trustee's breach."'
135
The trend today is towards a preference of third parties (i.e. the
banks) over trust beneficiaries when funds are misappropriated.1
36
More modern statutes impose liability when third party holders of
funds have actual notice rather than constructive or inquiry notice of a
breach of fiduciary duty. 137 The actual knowledge or bad faith stan-
dard offered by the U.F.A. at once acknowledges a need for broad
protection and retreats from this position. A requirement of good
faith severely limits the actual knowledge standard by imposing a duty
to investigate into the rightfulness of entitlement orders. The duty to
investigate runs counter to the stated purpose of the U.F.A. in reliev-
ing banks and agents from having to make extensive investigatory ef-
forts that slow the transaction process.
At some point, fiduciaries may even be excluded from holding cer-
tain types of securities or conducting transactions using certain tech-
nologies if banks are bound by a constructive knowledge standard.
New technology may make it impossible for banks to allow fiduciaries
to use technologies that do not allow effective oversight or sufficient
time to perform checks of entitlement orders. Even the current auto-
mated trading technologies may not allow banks to adequately investi-
gate orders by fiduciaries. Many transactions now are too highly
automated and fast to even allow anything other than a manual, ex
post review. A restriction on the fiduciary's choice of funds and trans-
actions means restricting the fiduciary's ability to serve the beneficiary
to the best means possible.
The U.F.A. and U.C.C. only relieve banks of an inquiry duty in the
absence of suspicion of wrongdoing. 138 Only minimal reason for sus-
picion will trigger a duty of inquiry akin to the common law standard.
133. Id. at 303 (Professor Scott's views had a direct impact on the drafting of the U.F.A.).
134. Id. at 304.
135. Id. at 303-04.
136. Id. The U.T.P.A. was the last uniform act drafted specifically in this area of the law and
also broadens the scope of protection the most from the common law. See also Section 11B.
137. See U.F.A. § 2, 7A U.L.A. 135 (1978); U.A.S.F.S.T., 7C U.L.A. 332 (1958); U.C.C. § 8-
115.
138. See U.C.C.; Unif. Fiduciaries Act §2, 7A U.L.A. 135 (1978) (constructive knowledge and
good faith standards require investigation when reasonable because liability can be imposed for
willful blindness).
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Thus, the protection afforded by the U.F.A., U.A.S.F.S.T., and U.C.C.
are somewhat illusory and undercut the underlying purposes of the
statutes. On the contrary, the U.T.P.A. only imposes liability on se-
curities intermediaries with actual knowledge of a fiduciary's breach
of duty.139 Even where a securities intermediary has knowledge of
suspicious circumstances, it is under no duty to inquire into the right-
fulness of its client fiduciary's powers. This standard parallels and en-
courages the increasingly efficient market systems.
Recognizing the possibility that courts may narrowly interpret the
powers of trustees and fiduciaries, many trust instruments are drafted
with broad powers to assure the proper functioning of the trust. In a
small part, some legislatures have granted broad powers to fiduciaries
through protection of the U.T.P.A. .140 Under the modern statutes, it
is assumed that the powers of fiduciaries are so broad that securities
intermediaries do not need to inquire into the scope of the powers to
assure that fiduciaries are acting properly. 141 For other legislatures
adopting the prior standard of inquiry duty, a securities intermediary
has to investigate into the proper powers of the fiduciary. Under the
U.T.P.A. and similar statutes, the burden of assuring fiduciaries act
rightfully is shifted to the drafters of the trust instruments and benefi-
ciaries. Economically, it is good policy for beneficiaries to assure not
only that a proper fiduciary is selected, one that can be trusted to act
rightfully, but also that the trust powers are not drafted any broader
than the beneficiary desires.
Transactions are becoming more automated and trustees are given
more freedom (in response to the increasing complexity of trust ar-
rangements and uses). The law, however, continues to retain the de-
cades-old constructive knowledge standard. At the very least, the
good faith standard should be read with an understanding that finan-
cial transactions are becoming too complex, numerous, and auto-
mated to impose a duty to inquire unless there is actual knowledge or
egregious circumstances, such as disregard of a missing Power of
Attorney.
Given the fact that most states have statutes that favor having in-
termediaries assume clients are acting properly, intermediaries are ex-
posed to a greater risk of missing the instances when the client has
acted beyond his or her powers. To add to this confusion, a construc-
tive knowledge standard adds to the confusion by making the knowl-
edge determination all the more unpredictable. Grant Gilmore, the
139. See U.T.P.A., 7C U.L.A. 388 (1964).
140. See generally Curtis, supra note 13.
141. Id. at 305.
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principal architect of the original Article 9 may have described it best
by stating that "[t]he presence or absence of 'knowledge' is a subjec-
tive question of fact, difficult to prove." Unless there is an over-
whelming policy argument in favor of using such a criterion, it is
always wise to discard it and to make the decision turn on some easily
determinable event.142 The drafters of the adopted legislation chose a
"knowledge" standard, but an actual knowledge standard is better be-
cause it dismisses the question of necessary degree. As is often the
case in high-stakes, high-volume transactions, one cannot easily deter-
mine what knowledge existed. An actual knowledge standard would
at least rest on more concrete circumstances. The constructive knowl-
edge standard only opens the door to our natural predilection to for-
get the benefits of hindsight and imply the requisite degree of
knowledge based on the surrounding external information.
An actual knowledge standard would not be entirely unfair for the
beneficiary. A securities intermediary would think and hope that a
client holding funds in a fiduciary relationship with a third party
would be more trustworthy than other clients. 143 Given a constructive
knowledge standard, these client accounts administered by fiduciaries
may need to be watched more closely by the bank than others by vir-
tue of the fact that a third party beneficiary has an interest in these
funds.144 An actual knowledge standard leaves the balance as it seems
to have been intended by the drafters of the various later model
statutes.
Where funds directed by a fiduciary become depleted due to the
fiduciary's own doing and the fiduciary cannot satisfy judgment, the
holding companies will become a natural scapegoat. If the trustor
chooses an untrustworthy person to act as the fiduciary, the intermedi-
ary will function almost like a default security on the funds. As is
often the case, however, beneficiaries know little about the operation
142. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2, 502 (1965).
143. Note that the drafting notes to the U.T.P.A. and other uniform laws indicates that the
drafters favored trustee self-regulation over trustor monitoring. The notes do not even mention
placing the burden of monitoring on the intermediary carrying out the transaction and holding
the funds.
144. In the situation where an intermediary holds funds in a nondiscretionary account, the
intermediary would not be liable for a loss of funds from particular transactions. Only where
advice is given as to investments would the duty of care owed by the intermediary to the client
be subjected to a heightened standard. First Am. Disc. Corp. v. Jacobs, 324 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1012
(2001); cf Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Heritage Capital Advisory Serv., Ltd. 823
F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1987). Moreover, this article does not discuss the case where the bank
itself is acting as trustee, which has been allowed by most courts and the SEC (under the Trust
and Fiduciary Activities Exemption).
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of the trust and do-not even want to know about its operation. 45
Beneficiaries often are happy simply to receive the proper funds with-
out getting involved in the intricacies of the trust creation and opera-
tion.146 The duty and/or rational necessity of monitoring trustee-client
actions, in addition to other factors like trustee solvency analysis, im-
posed by a constructive knowledge standard imposes an unduly op-
pressive burden on the holding banks. Nevertheless, requiring a
beneficiary to select a proper trustee does not require involvement in
the management of the trust. Given a beneficiary's pecuniary interest,
the beneficiary already takes some amount of interest in trustee selec-
tion. Moreover, shifting the burden onto the banks does not serve a
purpose other than transferring the loss to the entity with the most
money.
From an economic standpoint, an actual knowledge standard would
be more advantageous for the economy as a whole than a constructive
knowledge standard. Financial innovation has led to faster transfers
and new forms of money leading to greater economic growth. With-
out adopting a heightened, actual knowledge standard would eco-
nomic growth would be slowed. For example, how would a securities
intermediary holding funds for a fiduciary determine whether such fi-
nancial innovations, such as swaps accounts, are appropriate? In gen-
eral, broadening the protection afforded securities intermediaries in
all states would provide an opportunity for explosive financial innova-
tion in the field. Over the last century, financial innovation has been
spurred by either new technology or deregulation of markets. Tech-
nology in the financial field is exploding as technology inventions
starting from the early 1990's are adopted. As e-money becomes
more widely adopted, how will securities intermediaries be able to
comply with the inquiry duty imposed by a constructive knowledge
standard? 147 Even with the popularity and complex financial instru-
145. Where the settlor is also beneficiary, the settlor will be required to relinquish sufficient
control to effectuate a "transfer" as required for creation of the trust. Gay v. Gay, 1994 WL
530148, *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
146. Beneficiaries may prefer to have someone else with financial expertise manage the funds
or may simply not want to be burdened with the daily activities of actively managing the funds.
147. See Eric Brousseau, THE GOVERNANCE OF TRANSACTION BY COMMERCIAL IN-
TERMEDIARIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RE-ENGINEERING OF INTERMEDIATION BY ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE (Universite de Paris Pantheon Sorbonne). Third Conference of the International
Society for New Institutional Economics (Washington, D.C. Sept. 16-18, 1999) (arguing that the
rise of e-commerce will not lead to the substitution of financial intermediaries by electronic
networks). In this author's opinion, technology will lead instead to the vast improvements in the
existing financial systems. The current infrastructure will not likely be replaced but instead
transformed and made more efficient by faster, less costly transactions and the ability to gener-
ate more information about the functioning of the market.
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ments today, the documentation burden imposed by the constructive
knowledge standard hinders the administration of trusts. 148 In short,
financial innovation is pushing markets towards efficiency while the
safe-harbor laws become more the bain of the industry.
The costs to debt seekers (due to the duty of inquiry imposed by a
constructive knowledge standard on banks) in the indirect financing
market comes in the form of not just passing off costs but also a
shrinking market of competing banks offering the service. If securities
intermediaries are forced to incur greater costs when dealing with fi-
duciaries, some of these costs will be passed on to clients. In other
cases, the business of dealing with fiduciaries may not be viable given
the added costs and potential liability. With less intermediaries in the
market, the problems of asymmetric information, illiquidity, and
higher prices become greater. In a market with less liquidity and in-
formation, debt seekers are more likely to make costly decisions and
pay higher prices.
149
Imposing an inquiry duty would impede the efficient order of mar-
kets and further innovation with regard to the way securities in-
termediaries hold and transfer funds and even the forms of money.'
50
Such a duty could quickly make the holding of funds for fiduciary cli-
ents cost prohibitive, as financial transactions become more complex
and clients become more demanding on banks' ability to execute
transactions. As time passes, the highly dynamic financial industry
will only be more burdened by a duty of inquiry and risk of liability.
Even as the funds themselves begin to change in form and the transac-
tion becomes more automated, the banks will either have to figure out
how to integrate new innovation-both technological and financial in-
novation-with duties imposed by burdensome law or refrain from
utilizing innovative products and technologies. Relief of the burden
148. See Curtis, supra note 13 (writing that the chairman of the drafting committee of the
U.T.P.A. argued that the constructive knowledge standard inhibits the effective administration
of trusts).
149. Imposing costs on securities intermediaries, the primary underpinning of the indirect fi-
nancing market threatens the indirect financing system itself. See Raghuram G. Rajan, Do We
Still Need Commercial Banks?, Nat'i Bureau of Econ. Research, at http://www.nber.net/reporter/
fall98/rajanjfal198.html. (Mr. Rajan argues that commercial banks are still of great importance
in financial systems. The broader category of securities intermediaries, however, includes firms
that offer a wide variety of services of which commercial banking services are only a small part.
Additionally, this article focuses on the importance of intermediaries and the indirect financing
system and not commercial banking activities.).
150. The types of transactions, forms of money, and market participants have expanded rap-
idly in the latter part of the 20th century. By referring to innovations, I mean to refer to ad-
vances in trading technologies (e.g. web-based technologies and greater automation), new types
of financial instruments and securities, and changes in the markets themselves (especially in
regards to the globalization of the market).
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of a duty to inquire allows the industry to evolve freely rather than
directing or restricting its progress. 151
Critics of statutes providing higher levels of protection for banks
dealing with fiduciaries may also argue that third party beneficiaries
are not able to assure that the banks exercise reasonable diligence and
care with regard to their funds.152 It cannot be concluded that provid-
ing more protection to banks with fiduciary clients will necessarily in-
crease the amount of cases where fiduciaries misappropriate
beneficiaries' funds. If banks holding funds for third parties are
clearly given more protection, the burden will be shifted to the third
party beneficiaries to take steps to protect themselves rather than re-
lying blindly on the courts to provide compensation for any resulting
losses. It would be less likely for a fiduciary to misappropriate a bene-
ficiary's funds if the beneficiary exercised due diligence in selecting
the fiduciary.
The selection of the fiduciary may be the most important step in the
process in structuring a trust. It is more efficient to stop the breach of
duty at the early stages. It would clearly be unreasonable to give your
money to a complete stranger on the street to hold and then complain
later when the stranger has used it. Likewise, trustors should not be
allowed to dismiss their duty to diligently select proper fiduciaries and
later rely on claims against third parties only indirectly involved in the
agreements.
If the trustor/drafter is uncomfortable with the fiduciary having
broad powers, the trustor could simply add provisions to limit the
trustee's powers rather than relying on the bank to oversee the orders
of the trustee. The trustor could additionally require communication
with the beneficiary, such as accounting provision with more bite or
retain particular powers for the settlor and beneficiary. Such provi-
sions might hinder the fiduciary's ability and the flexibility of the trust,
but the burden is more fairly placed on the beneficiary and trustor
rather than a third party bank with little to gain and no control over
the agreement itself. This also allows the trustor to strike the balance
of power rather than the court.
151. Elimination of regulations and beneficial changes in laws have often been a source of
financial innovation. As an example, repeal of Regulation Q and allowance of payment of inter-
est on deposits led to an explosion of new financial products at the end of the last century.
152. See generally Curtis, supra note 13.
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The news over the course of the last year is a testament to the fact
that forcing banks to monitor the actions of clients is often fruitless.
153
It is more effective and efficient for those more intimately involved
with the transactions to monitor them than third parties. By this I
mean that banks do not have the tools or resources to monitor fiduci-
ary actions as well as beneficiaries. It is true that the bank effectuates
the transaction and thus has "knowledge" of the transactions them-
selves, but in terms of the rightfulness of the transactions, the benefi-
ciaries are in a better position than the banks if the trustor so intended
and provided. It is also true that banks have a lot of resources, but
they do not have more idle resources. Also, the greater number of
transactions makes it harder to police the transactions. The benefi-
ciaries, in contrast, have a direct interest in the funds and should take
an interest in the details of the fiduciary's powers and duties.
A further reason for shifting the burden to the beneficiary is to
avoid having the courts frustrate the actual intent of beneficiaries. In
many circumstances, the trustor intended to give the fiduciary broad
power and intended for the beneficiary not to monitor or take part in
the administration of the funds from the creation of the trust forward.
In other circumstances, the trustor may choose to grant the benefici-
ary greater oversight and hold limited powers of control (e.g. power of
revocation for instances of suspicious fiduciary actions). Thus, with a
low standard of protection, the intent of the trustor may be frustrated
where the beneficiary intends to grant the fiduciary very broad powers
but the law imposes a duty on the holding bank to intervene and in-
vestigate transactions directed by the fiduciary.
In the case where the fiduciary is given unlimited powers over large
sums of funds and no one monitoring the transactions, the courts
should not be involved where the natural consequence of negligent
trustee selection by the trustor is heightened risk of conversion of the
funds. It is bad policy to promote the use of the courts as a lifeboat
for bad commercial practices.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF AN ACrTUAL
KNOWLEDGE STANDARD
The economic arguments that follow assume that the relevant mar-
kets are operating efficiently. Thus, any added risks or costs will be
incorporated into the market price and raise the cost of obtaining cap-
153. Even when banks and officers can still be held liable for contributory negligence, we
have still seen a rash of fraud cases and other corporate malfeasance and a breakdown in moni-
toring of corporate actions.
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ital. As this article argues, the cost savings and lowered risk resulting
from adoption of an actual knowledge standard would lead to eco-
nomic expansion.
Before discussing the economic impact of adoption of the actual
knowledge standard, the Efficient Capital Market Theory (ECMT)
should first be briefly explained. ECMT states that the price offered
in the market represents the best price given all available informa-
tion.1 54 The market will swiftly match buyers and sellers and shift the
price until it finds equilibrium. Any new information in the market
will be instantly incorporated into the price. The market price cannot
account for unknown risks, but it will incorporate all information in
the marketplace. 55 If the market does not work efficiently, the price
will no longer represent the best price available. As an example, if the
market only consists of a few buyers and sellers, the illiquidity of the
market would prevent the price from stabilizing.
A. Above-the-line Benefits
By granting the holding bank greater protection, the fiduciary will
clearly be able to effect transactions more efficiently. Without a
court-imposed need for the bank to investigate, the transactions can
be effectuated faster. Moreover, under a standard that does not gen-
erally require a case-by-case determination of the investigative duty,
more transactions can be performed automatically, which would allow
for a significant efficiency benefit. The banks will be able to assume
the fiduciary is acting properly and assume the beneficiary intended
such powers.
Such deregulation of transactions by banks for fiduciaries would
likely lead to financial innovation giving further benefit to benefi-
ciaries and those involved in the creation and administration of the
trusts. In the past few decades, we have already seen a host of new
financial instruments and mechanisms for effectuating transactions as
a result of deregulation. The same may result from less involvement
of the courts.
Under an actual knowledge standard, the intent of the settlor may
be carried forward without frustration. A constructive knowledge
154. "Available information" consists of historical information, public information and all in-
formation whether public or available to insiders only.
155. Weak-form efficiency implies that the market cannot be beat using historical data and
technical analyses. One might beat the market, however, if inside information is used. Strong-
form efficiency implies that the market price is the best price given all public and non-public
information. Thus, only through the ability to forecast the future or access to inside information
will the buyer know how to beat the market. Assuming the securities markets work efficiently,
any known information, including risk information, will be reflected in the market price.
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standard requires banks to become involved in the fiduciary's actions
whether the settlor intended such a result or not. The benefit to the
beneficiary decreases as a result as well.
Given an actual knowledge standard, the fiduciary can order trans-
actions to be processed without hindrance. If the trustor desires
greater oversight, the trustor can include appropriate provisions in the
trust instrument. Trust instruments can still be drafted with broad
powers entrusted to fiduciaries to assure smooth operation of the trust
without the necessity of beneficiary involvement. The trustor, how-
ever, will still have the burden of initially assuring that the selection of
the fiduciary in whom the beneficiary will place his or her reliance is
not dismissed as a mere technicality. In essence, in exchange for the
ability to grant broad powers to the fiduciary to relieve the beneficiary
of responsibility for most aspects of the trust operation, the trustor
must not shirk his or her duty to the beneficiary. At minimum, the
trustor and beneficiary must assure that a proper person is selected as
fiduciary. An actual knowledge standard rightfully holds beneficiaries
responsible for negligent selection of fiduciaries. 156 Under an actual
knowledge standard, the level of oversight can be controlled by the
trustor rather than as a de facto default standard under the law.
Given the elimination of the duty of inquiry imposed by a construc-
tive knowledge standard, inquiry into the rightfulness of transactions
and powers of fiduciary clients can be made on the basis of effective-
ness as determined by the market. If a demand truly exists for the
settlor to assure that banks retain more oversight over the orders of
fiduciaries, the market will create the niche. Moreover, securities in-
termediaries often compete for assets on the basis of reputation rather
than price. Thus they have an incentive to manage the transactions
and ensure that clients, especially those serving as fiduciaries, are act-
ing within the proper bounds of their powers and the law. Any associ-
ation with impropriety can permanently mar the reputation of the
bank. The adoption of a U.T.P.A. standard may eliminate a good
faith requirement, but no bank will want to be known as a bank that
turns a blind eye to wrongful actions.
Some commentators argue that there is little merit in favoring third
parties who deliberately shield themselves from the truth over inno-
cent trust beneficiaries. 157 Unlike the real estate market or other
156. U.T.P.A. imposes liability only where there is actual knowledge of fiduciary's breach of
duty and does not impose a duty to inquire into the rightfulness of fiduciary's instructions even
where suspicious circumstances exist.
157. See Curtis, supra note 13 (citing other authorities supporting the argument against the
elimination of the constructive knowledge and good faith standards).
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physical markets, the great majority of transactions by fiduciaries do
not relate to financial instruments in the direct and indirect financing
systems. In such markets, it is expensive to monitor the
transactions.
158
The current problems in the stock market relating to spinning off
shares, collusion between stock analysts and investment banking arms,
and other similar problems show the difficulty in preventing even the
more readily discoverable problems in the markets. In these circum-
stances, it would make more sense for the beneficiary to limit the
powers of the fiduciary rather than a grant broad powers and turning
a blind eye to the actions of the fiduciary.
B. Benefits of the Elimination of the Inquiry Duty Entirely
Not only does an actual knowledge standard allow fiduciaries to
perform their duties more effectively, as all the uniform acts in this
area intended, but the elimination of a duty to inquire would also reap
market-wide cost savings. 159 These cost savings and benefits include
(1) not passing on cost to other blameless clients 160 (2) less litigation
(3) decrease in breaches by forcing principals to act 161 and (4) al-
lowing securities intermediaries more freedom - financial innovation.
C. Benefits of a Uniform Standard
In addition to the benefits of an actual knowledge standard versus a
constructive knowledge standard, there are great benefits to a uniform
adoption of a single standard. For reasons already stated, securities
intermediaries dealing with fiduciaries should be provided a minimum
level of protection from liability to third party beneficiaries. The cur-
rent trend is to afford greater protection to securities intermediaries;
however, there is inconsistency in the level of protection provided by
the statutes of each state. The inconsistency leads to several
problems.
158. See Id. at 308-09. Real estate property is used for example only. The U.A.S.F.S.T.,
U.C.C., and other statutes only extend to transactions involving commercial paper and similar
financial instruments determined by the specific statute. For example, the U.A.S.F.S.T. does not
extend to Treasury-backed instruments.
159. The above sections have already explored the costs of requiring an inquiry into each
transaction. This section and subsection D provide analysis of the cost savings from eliminating
the current standard.
160. Judgments resulting from liability under the constructive knowledge standard will have
to be passed off to all clients, meaning that most everyone seeking financing in the indirect
financing system, such as banks, will internalize these costs.
161. Shifting the burden to trustors will force them to take greater care in selecting fiduciary
and thus decrease the chances of the fiduciary breaching his or her duty.
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Over the last century, the financial markets have become increas-
ingly more innovative and broader in reach. Due to the complexity of
trust agreements and the number of parties involved, a larger bank is
often selected to hold the funds of the trust. Moreover, it is increas-
ingly rare for a bank to only be located within one state or even to
hold funds pursuant to a trust agreement for parties all located in one
state. Due to the interstate nature of the transactions, it would be
suitable for national protection to be afforded to banks dealing with
fiduciaries to provide predictability. The costs to banks for doing bus-
iness in states with many different laws is obvious and accepted; yet, in
this area of the law, there are added unjustifiable costs. As mentioned
above, in states where the U.T.P.A. has been adopted in addition to
other uniform acts protecting banks holding funds for fiduciaries, the
unpredictability of the outcome adds to the cost of interstate busi-
ness.162 A predictable, nationwide standard of protection would
therefore offer exponential benefits.
D. Practical Market Problems with a Constructive
Knowledge Standard
Several market-related problems are solved with the elimination of
the constructive knowledge standard. First, securities intermediaries
handle an enormous volume of transactions each and every day. The
complexity associated with these transactions further complicates the
ability to "police" the transfer orders. It is hard to "police" fiduciary
orders now, but this will become even harder in the future. Second,
imposing liability on the entities completing the transfers misaligns in-
centives and deterrents. Principals stand in the best position to ensure
that fiduciaries do not breach their duties yet do not have an incentive
to do so. The current standard instead provides an incentive to securi-
ties intermediaries to provide inferior service in the form of client pri-
vacy intrusion and erecting bureaucratic obstructions to transactions.
Third, the current standard has kept costs artificially high by creating
an unpredictable standard. Fourth, a further savings can be obtained
by realizing greater efficiencies of shifting the burden to principals.
The current standard also creates unnecessary congestion in the
courts.
162. Compare Wiley v. Toppings, 556 S.E.2d 818, 820 (W. Va. 2001) (when two enactments
conflict, courts generally follow the black-letter principle that "effect should always be given to
the latest... expression of the legislative will ...." and thus the U.C.C. would control over all)
with Wetherill v. Bank IV Kansas, 145 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) ("a fundamental premise
of statutory construction is that a specific statute dealing with a subject controls over the general
statute on the subject, unless it appears the legislature intended the general act to control," and
thus U.T.P.A. controls over the U.C.C.).
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First, securities intermediaries are ill-equipped to "police" all the
transfers of securities ordered by fiduciaries. Securities intermediaries
transact an exorbitant number of securities transfers each day. These
transfers consist of innumerable types and for a variety of types of
clients. Under the common law duty of inquiry, banks routinely re-
quire extensive documentation for fiduciary transfers to assure them-
selves that the fiduciaries were acting rightfully in order to protect
themselves from liability. As a result, fiduciary transfers were time-
consuming, inefficient, and costly. The modern uniform acts have lim-
ited liability somewhat, but not enough. The bank must still investi-
gate when it has any suspicion that the fiduciary may be breaching his
or her duty.
163
Both securities intermediaries and beneficiaries may be in a posi-
tion to assure the funds are properly applied. Securities in-
termediaries are conducting the transfers and can easily monitor
specific transactions. Settlor-trustors, however, are the ones who have
the sole power to select the fiduciaries and assure they that will act
properly. It is unfair to place the burden on securities intermediaries
to "police" wrongful fiduciaries that were selected by negligent
trustors.
Moreover, even though securities intermediaries are effectuating
the transfers, they do not have the resources to monitor these transac-
tions nor has this added transaction cost been factored into the
charges to clients. In order to properly "police" fiduciary transfers, a
method must be in place to flag transfer directives made by fiducia-
ries. Such a method assumes that the banks at least have knowledge
of which clients are serving as fiduciaries. Once the orders are sin-
gled-out, they must be evaluated. Under the current standard, banks
are effectively required to evaluate the orders on a case-by-case basis
against the power assumed by the fiduciaries under the individual
trust agreements. It is clear that in order for a bank to avoid liability
under the current standard would be clearly cost and time-prohibitive.
Second, imposing liability on the entities completing the transfers
misaligns incentives and deterrents. As mentioned above, securities
intermediaries are not able to prevent anything more than the most
obvious breaches of fiduciary duties. Regardless of the high standard,
it can be argued that the statutes have exceeded their level of deter-
rent utility.
163. See, e.g., U.F.A. §2, 7A U.L.A. 135 (1978), Model Fiduciary Stock Transfer Act,
U.A.S.F.S.T., 7C U.L.A. 332 (1958).
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Third, the current standard has kept costs artificially high by creat-
ing an unpredictable standard. Under the constructive knowledge
standard, securities intermediaries can never be sure if they will be
held liable. Due to the complexity of the business, determinations will
often require an involved determination case-by-case. As transactions
become more complex, the standard of reasonable suspicion will only
become more vague and meaningless. Reasonable suspicion also fo-
cuses on the action of the fiduciary without taking into account the
bank's available resources.
Fourth, an actual awareness standard would shift the burden of pre-
vention to principals who are in the best position to prevent such
losses. It is inefficient to place the burden on securities intermediaries
without the resources to commit to policing transactions. Solving a
problem is more effective if done at the source: when the settlor
selects the fiduciary.
Lastly, the constructive knowledge standard frustrates the underly-
ing purpose of the statutes. In all states where the U.F.A., U.C.C., or
similar statutes have been adopted, the legislature intended to afford
protection to securities intermediaries dealing with fiduciaries. 164
Beneficiaries can still usurp the protection provided by these statutes
simply by arguing that the securities intermediary had knowledge of
the fiduciary's powers or at least knowledge of the trust agreement
and failed to request it. The securities intermediary will therefore be
charged with knowledge that the fiduciary was acting beyond the
scope of its powers. The bank may have knowledge of the trust agree-
ments and powers of attorney in its possession, but it cannot reasona-
bly be expected to hold intimate knowledge of their contents in
relation to each and every transaction executed. The prefatory notes
to the U.F.A. show that the legislatures did not intend for protection
to be determined on the mere basis of whether the bank had knowl-
edge that the client was acting as a fiduciary; yet, such knowledge can
be used by the beneficiary to hold the bank liable. An actual knowl-
edge standard would assure conclusively that securities intermediaries
may properly assume that entitlement orders from fiduciaries are
proper to make administration of the trust more effective.
V. CONCLUSION
Most states currently have limited the common law duty of inquiry
with respect to fiduciary entitlement orders. States have chosen to
adopt the variations of the U.F.A. and U.A.S.F.S.T. . Most states
164. See the prefatory notes to U.C.C. § 8-115 and U.F.A., supra note 163.
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have adopted the U.C.C., however, § 8-115 has not yet been em-
braced. All of these statutes have a good faith requirement requiring
securities intermediaries to make an investigation into fiduciary or-
ders when reasonable suspicion exists. The U.T.P.A., drafted in 1964
and the latest statute dealing specifically with this issue, adopts an ac-
tual knowledge standard without requiring a good faith showing.
The U.T.P.A. actual knowledge standard provides several economic
and practical benefits over a constructive knowledge or good faith
standard. First, an actual knowledge standard shifts the burden onto
trustors. As a consequence, a trustor has an incentive to take the se-
lection of a fiduciary more seriously thus decreasing the likelihood of
wrongful actions by the fiduciary. Second, banks are relieved of a
duty to investigate suspicious circumstances. By relieving banks of ex-
posure to liability and the burden of investigation, more financial effi-
ciencies are likely to result due to the effect on the market. Also, with
less involvement by the bank, the fiduciary can administer the trust
more effectively without delays due to required documentation and
checks by the bank. Eliminating the requirement of involvement by
banks also allows the trustor to more effectively carry out their intent.
With an actual knowledge standard, the trustor can write into the trust
agreement how much the bank and beneficiary should be involved
rather than leaving it to a default standard.165 Lastly, by eliminating
the duty imposed on the banks holding the funds, cost-savings can be
realized and passed on to the beneficiaries.
For all of these reasons, an actual knowledge standard should be
adopted by all the states. An actual knowledge standard is essential to
ensure that the indirect financing system continues to work efficiently
and trust administration is not hindered further.
165. As an example of limiting the level of involvement, the agreement may establish a bal-
ance of oversight responsibility between the beneficiary, the fiduciary, and the bank holding the
fiduciary's assets. Under the de facto default standard, i.e. constructive knowledge, suspicious
circumstances trigger a duty to investigate on the part of the bank. This is the default, or mini-
mum standard, and creates a tricky problem for the trustor that desires a higher trigger-point
before the bank has a duty to investigate.
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